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In the conventional literature related to investment decisions, less attention has been paid to 
the length of maturity when investment is debt-financed. In such a case a firm pays the 
creditor not only the sum of annual interest (initial investment cost multiplied by real interest 
rate) for the entire borrowing years but also the total amount of initial investment cost at the 
end of the borrowing period. In this study, the effects of selecting different maturity years on 
firms’ investment decisions are compared on the basis of the simple net present value (NPV) 
model. Without taxation, the NPV is equal to the present value (PV) of future gross return less 
the PV of the cost of investment. An investment project is considered to be profitable when 
the NPV is positive. After the introduction of a corporate income tax, the PV of an asset 
amounts to the sum of PVs of net return (gross return less taxes) and tax savings led by an 
incentive depreciation provision. If the investment is debt-financed, the interest payment 
additionally reduces the corporate tax base. The research findings suggest that (1) ceteris 
paribus an optimum maturity year appears to exist that maximises the NVP, and (2) the 
change of optimum debt maturity tends to correlate positively with the corporate tax rate but 
negatively with the interest rate. In the case of prevailing inflation, there is a mismatch 
between the nominal interest rate that is a discounting factor for all observed in- and outflows 
and the real interest rate by which the annual interest payment is determined for the entire 
maturity period. 
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In the corporate finance literature it is suggested that maturity of debt in forms of bank
credit and bond can play an important role in reducing costs associated with debt financing
(Ozkan, 2000). When investment is debt-financed, an investing firm pays the creditor
not only the sum of annual interest (i.e. initial investment cost multiplied by the real
interest rate) for the entire borrowing years but also the total amount of initial
investment cost at the end of the borrowing period.
Among previous research works on this matter, Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995)
argue that long-term debt is the preferred financing instrument of choice when the degree
of asymmetric information increases over time. A positive correlation is also often
observed between the size of firm and debt maturity as shown by Jalilvand and Harris
(1984). Issuing costs of a public bond are fixed for the largest part and therefore are
independent of the magnitude of debt. This enables the realisation of economies of scale.
For this reason, larger firms will issue public debt which generally has a longer maturity
that private debt, for instance.
1 Furthermore, studies made by Brick and Ravid (1985),
Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985), and Scholes and Wolfson (1992) highlight the
parallel development of the interest tax shield on debt (consequently the value of firm) and
the term structure of debt. When the term structure of the interest rate slopes upward, long-
term debt is optimal since the saving from leverage due to the interest tax shield is
accelerated (borrower’s incentive) and recognition of interest income is delayed (lender’s
incentive). By contrast, a negative relation of debt maturity appears to be pronounced with
growth opportunity (Myers, 1977; Titman, 1992). The short-term debt mitigates the
underinvestment problem
2 if it matures before growth options are exercised, as there
remains an opportunity for lenders and borrowers to re-contract. Firms with a better credit
                    
1  Larger firms also appear to have lower agency costs. According to Smith and Warner (1979), small
firms are more likely to face potential conflict of interest between a firm’s shareholders and
bondholders such as risk shifting and claim dilution. This problem can be reduced by issuing more
shorter-term debts. Moreover larger firms have a much easier access to the capital markets (Titman and
Wessels, 1988), and small firms are generally precluded from accessing long-term debt markets, since
the proportion of their collateralisable assets to future investment opportunities is relatively small
(Whited, 1992).
2  According to Myers (1977), it is possible under debt financing that managers do not carry out
investment with a positive net present value. When leverage is high, residual claims will be very low
and profits from investment will only benefit creditors. Managers will be reluctant to pursue future
investments which, however, reduce the investment opportunity set and ultimately firm value.3
record tend to borrow on the long-term (Flannery, 1986; Mitchell, 1991). A high liquidity
ratio may reduce the fund raising capacity of the firms as excessive liquidity reduces
managers’ ability to commit credibly to an investment activity, which will, in turn, shorten
the maturity for available debts (Diamond, 1991; Myers and Rajan, 1998). The principle of
matching debt and asset maturity has traditionally been acknowledged as a useful
benchmark for selecting the borrowing years, because in this way the risk that cash inflows
are insufficient to cover the interest payments and capital outlays is reduced (Morris, 1976;
Myers, 1977; Hart and Moore, 1994; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Emery, 2001).
3 Leland and
Thoft (1996) show that optimal leverage depends on debt maturity and is lower when the
firm is financed by short-term debt. Furthermore, debt maturity is determined as a result of
a trade-off between tax advantages and leverage-related costs, including agency costs,
suggesting that riskier firms should issue short-term debt in addition to using less debt.
This study begins with revisiting the Miller-Modigliani paper (1958) which
demonstrates that not only the capital structure of a firm but also debt maturity is irrelevant
in a perfect capital market. Unlike the theoretical and empirical investigations mentioned
above, this study suggests a possibility of an optimal debt maturity year, which delivers
ceteris paribus the maximum net present value. Furthermore, it aims at elaborating the
sensitivity of optimum debt maturity to the variation of corporate tax, interest and inflation
rates.
The present value model is a well-known basic investment decision model. Without
taxation, the net present value (NPV) is equal to the present value of future gross return,
discounted at an appropriate interest rate less the present value of the cost of investment.
An investment project is therefore considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive.
After the introduction of tax on corporate income, the annual tax base is reduced by the
sum of annual interest payments, whereas the discount rates also declines with the tax rate.
A tax paradox occurs when tax depreciation is greater than Samuelson’s true economic
depreciation (TED). Under the assumption of a perfect competitive market structure, only
one interest rate exists in the financial market. In the case of prevailing inflation, there is a
mismatch between the nominal interest rate that is a discounting factor for all observed in-
and outflows and the real interest rate by which the annual interest payment is determined
                    
3  According to this principle, debt with a maturity shorter than the maturity of asset is risky, because the
asset may not yield enough profits to pay the debt. Debt with a maturity longer than the asset maturity4
for the entire maturity period.
II Modigliani-Miller Theorem of Capital Structure Revisited
Miller and Modigliani (1958) asserted that under certain assumptions such as (1) perfect
markets (i.e. no taxes or transaction costs), (2) cash flows that are independent of financial
structure, and (3) riskless debt such that firms and individuals can borrow and lend at a
risk free interest rate, the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. This
theory can also be illustrated in terms of the present value model as follows.
Assume that for equity-finance the following condition is satisfied in the equilibrium
Ψ 0
  =  C   (II-1)
where Ψ 0 is the present value of future gross return at year 0 generated by an investment
costing C.
In the case of financing C through debt, a firm pays the creditor not only the annual
interest of rC for s years long but also the entire amount of C to the creditor at the end of
this borrowing period. Therefore, the present value of total cost at year 0 (C*0) can be
expressed:
 s
C*0  = ∫   rCe
-ru du + Ce
-rs
 0
    = (1–e
-rs)C + Ce
-rs = C   (II-2)
where r = real interest rate (0 < r < 1) and s = debt maturity years (s > 0).
Hence, in the absence of tax, for example, the condition shown in equation (II-1)
applies in the equilibrium regardless of the financial structure (i.e. C*0 = C = Ψ 0). At the
same time equation (II-2) suggests that the debt maturity is also irrelevant under the
                                                            
is also risky, since debt has to be repaid when the asset no longer yields a return.5
assumed capital market condition.
In the equilibrium without tax, equation (II-3) additionally proves that inflation does
not matter for financial decision-making either if the annual interest payment is made
based on the nominal interest rate for s years long.
   s
nC*0  = ∫   (r+π )Ce 
-(r + π )u du + Ce 
-(r + π )s
   0
   1 – e 
-(r+π )s
 = (r+π )C { —————— } + Ce 
-(r+π )s = C = Ψ 0     (II-3)
    r+π
where nC*0 = the nominal present value of total cost at year 0 and π  = inflation rate (0 < π
< 1).
If the interest payment takes place annually, applying the real interest rate in spite of
prevailing inflation, as it is the case in practice, then
   s
nC*0  = ∫   rCe 
-(r + π )u du + Ce 
-(r + π )s
   0
1 – e 
-(r+π )s       C
 = rC { —————— } + Ce 
-(r+π )s =   ——— {r + π  e 
-(r+π )s} < C (II-4)
r+π   r+π
III Optimal Debt Maturity Revealed in Net Present Value Model
III.1 Without Inflation
Under the assumption that
•   an investment costing C generates an infinite stream of future gross return,6
•   this return exponentially declines at the rate α  (0 < α  < 1) 
4and
•   all prices are constant over time (π  = 0),
a debt-financed investment project is on the margin of acceptance in the absence of
taxation, when
  ∞              s
Ce
–rs =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du  –  ∫  rCe
–ru du
   0            0
   A0
=  ——— – (1 – e
–rs)C     (III-1)
  α +r
where A0 = gross return at the year of investment.
Consequently,
  A0
Ψ 0  =  ———  =  C (III-2)
      α +r
In this case, the net present value Y (= Ψ 0 – C) amounts to zero.
After the introduction of a tax on corporate income (t), the annual tax base is reduced by
the sum of the annual interest payment, whereas the discount rate is also reduced by the
tax rate. Samuelson (1964) showed in his fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that
corporate income taxation does not affect firms’ investment decisions at all, when true
economic depreciation (TED) — the negative change in value of asset in the course of
time — is deducted from an expected gross stream of return when calculating tax profits,
and when the TED rate is the same as α . In other words, a tax paradox occurs when the tax
depreciation is greater than TED (King, 1977; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; King and
Fullerton, 1984; Sinn, 1987).
                    
4 The assumption of declining gross return in the course of time is often made in practice, because it is
hardly possible to forecast the development of future profit. This type of assumption appears to be more
plausible than the one with constant annual profit.7
The amount of geometric-degressive depreciation expense in the period u is measured
Du
gdd  =  δ Ce
–δ u     (III-3)
where δ  is the geometric-degressive depreciation rate (0 < δ  < 1) and Ce
–δ u shows the net
book value of capital good in the period u.
Hence, with debt finance and geometric-degressive depreciation, the net present value
of the asset at time 0 is
  ∞                                       s                                   ∞
Y  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du – (1–t) ∫  rCe
–r(1–t)u du + tC ∫  δ e
–{δ +r(1–t)}u du – Ce
–rs
     0                                       0                                   0
   A0                        δ              α
     =  ———— + tC {———— – ————} – {1 – e
–r(1–t)s}C – Ce
–rs     (III-4)
   α +r                  δ +r(1–t)      α +r(1–t)
When δ  > α , geometric-degressive depreciation provides incentives.
There is an optimal debt maturity s* when the first order condition of equation (III-4) is
zero and its second derivation is negative:
   ∂ Y
———  =  rCe
–rs – r(1–t)Ce
–r(1-t)s = 0 (III-5)
    ∂ s
The second derivation of equation (III-4) is always smaller than zero
  ∂
2Y





–r(1–t)s <  0 (III-6)
    ∂ s
2
since the sum of r
2Ce
–rs is always larger than the second term of equation (III-6) by the
given parameter constellation.8
Therefore, the optimal debt maturity s* can be derived from equation (III-5)
  ln (1/1–t)
s*  =  —————     (III-7)
   rt
The sensitivity of s* in relation to the changes of r can be expressed
∂ s*  ln (1/1–t)
———  =  –  —————  <  0     (III-8)
∂ rr
2t
Ceteris paribus the condition shown in equation (III-8) is always smaller than zero,
implying the negative correlation between s* and r.
The optimal debt maturity s* varies also when t changes
∂ s*   1     ln (1/1–t)
———  =  —————  –  —————  >  0 (III-9)
 ∂ t     rt(1–t) rt
2
By the given parameter selection the first term of equation (III-9) is always larger than the
second one. Thus equation (III-9) demonstrates the positive relationship between s* and t.
III.2 With Inflation
In an economy with a constant inflation rate π , the stream of gross return which is
generated by an investment costing C at time u is
Au = A0e
–α ue
π u = A0e
–(α –π )u    (III-10)
In this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at the rate α  (0 < α  <
1) but increases at the rate π  in the course of time.
When employing the historical accounting method, the nominal net present value at the9
year 0 is
5
  ∞                                              s                                    ∞
Y(n)  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{(α –π )+µ  (1–t)}u du – (1–t) ∫  rCe
–µ  (1–t)u du + tC ∫  δ e
–{δ +µ  (1–t)}u du
          0                                                    0                                    0
           –  Ce
–µ s
      A0                       δ             α  r
        =  ———— + tC {———— – ————} –  —— {1 – e
–µ  (1–t)s}C – Ce
–µ s
      (α –π )+µ                δ +r(1–t)      α +r(1–t)       µ
(III-11)
where µ  = nominal interest rate (= r + π ).
When the first order condition of equation (III-11)
  ∂ Y(n) µ r(1–t)Ce
-µ  (1-t)s
———  = µ Ce
-µ s – —————————  =  0 (III-12)
    ∂ s µ
subject to
   ∂




————  =  – (–µ )
2Ce
–µ s  + ——————————— <  0 (III-13)
∂ s
2 µ
                    
5  Under historical cost accounting, the capital to be recovered before a profit is recognised as simply the
amount of money originally invested in the firm. Historical profit is, therefore, the current period’s
revenues minus the historical cost of the inputs necessary to secure them, the current period’s expenses.
It has long been recognised that increases in input prices can cause historical cost accounting to
seriously overstate a firm’s ability to distribute its reported profits, continue producing the same
physical volume of goods and services, and understate the firm’s capital. The application of the
historical cost accounting method when calculating the corporate tax base causes fictitious profits in
inflationary phases that are also subject to tax. Therefore, in periods with inflation generous tax
depreciation provisions do not adequately promote private investment as intended but only (or partly)
compensate the losses caused by inflation (Aaron, 1976; Kay, 1977; Feldstein, 1979; Kopcke, 1981;
Gonedes, 1984; Nam and Radulescu, 2003).10
then the optimum debt maturity s(n)* exists
ln [µ  / {r(1–t)}]
s(n)*  =  ——————————— (III-14)
  µ t
The optimal debt maturity s(n)* varies according to π
∂ s(n)*    1     ln [µ  / {r(1–t)}]
————  =  —————  –  —————————  >  0 (III-15)
 ∂π  µ
2 t     µ
2 t
Equation (III-15) is always positive by the given parameter selection and suggests the
parallel development of s(n)* with π .
IV Model Simulation
Firstly we consider the case without inflation. Table 1 shows the changes of (real) net
present value with geometric-degressive depreciation (Y) according to the debt maturity
period (s). For the calculation three corporate tax rates are considered (i.e., t = 15%, 25%
and 35%). Ceteris paribus the decrease in (real) interest rate from 8% to 4% leads to the
changes in the margin of acceptance for the investment project. The TED rate (= α ) is
assumed to be 20%,
6 whereas δ  amounts to 30%, meaning that in our partial model
simulation tax depreciation provides investment incentives. Taking the case with t = 35%
and r = 8% as an initial one, s* is around 16 years with Y = 63. The change of r to 4%
increases s* to about 30 years (with Y = 71), as already indicated in equation (III-8). With
r = 4% the decrease in t from 35% to 25% (or 15%) leads to the decrease in s* to 28 years
with Y = 28 (or Y =  48). This parallel relationship is technically expressed in equation
(III-9). This empirical founding suggests that s* reacts quite sensitively to the real interest
                    
6  In a number of studies, including Sinn, Leibfritz and Weicherieder (1999), Bordignon, Giannini and
Panteghini (1999), as well as Nam and Radulescu (2003), the economic asset life is (sometimes
implicitly) assumed to be around 10 years for equipment. From this asset life one can derive α  by the11
rate movement.
In a similar way Table 2 illustrates the changes of nominal net present values Y(n)
caused by the variation of s. Apart from the standard assumptions made in Table 1, two
inflation rates (π  = 3% and 6%) are additionally taken into account in the computation
implying that µ  amounts to 7% and 11%, respectively. In the case of adopting t = 25% and
r = 8%, the falling π  from 6% to 3% leads to the decrease of s(n)* from 24 years with Y(n)
= 165 to 22 years with Y(n) = 115. Such a movement appears to be less significant with r
= 4%.
                                                            
given relevant parameter constellation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).12
Table 1 Optimal Debt Maturity in the Absence of Inflation
Y
t = 15% t = 25% t = 35%



















































































































































































Debt finance; C = 416.7 with r = 4% but 357.1 with r = 8%; A0 = 100; α  = 20%
and δ  = 30%
Source: Own calculations13
Table 2 Optimal Debt Maturity in Inflationary Phase
Y(n)
π  = 3% π  = 6%
































































































































Debt finance; C = 416.7 with r = 4% but 357.1 with r = 8%; A0 = 100; α  =
20%, δ  = 30% and t = 25%
Source: Own calculations14
V Conclusion
The selection of maturity years can play a significant role in reducing costs related to the
debt-financed investment. In this case an investing firm pays the creditor the sum of
annual interest for the borrowing years in addition to the repayment of the total amount
of initial cost at the end of the borrowing period. Referring to the already existing
theoretical framework suggesting different relationships of debt maturity with the
determinants like firm size, growth opportunity, liquidity risk, creditworthiness, interest
tax shield, asset maturity, leverage, agency costs, etc., the effects of choosing maturity
years on firms’ investment decisions are compared on the basis of the simple net present
value (NPV) model. After the brief theoretical demonstration of the irrelevance of debt
maturity in a perfect capital market, this study highlights the existence of optimum
maturity s* at which, ceteris paribus, the (real and nominal) NPV reaches a maximum.
Furthermore, this study also elaborates the sensitivity of s* to the variation of corporate
tax, interest and inflation rates. As also illustrated in the partial model simulation based on
the selected parameters, the optimum debt maturity is correlated positively with the
corporate tax rate but negatively with the interest rate. In the case of prevailing inflation, a
further positive relationship is observed between s* and the inflation rate.
References
Aaron, H. J. (1976), Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in: Aaron, H. J., (Ed.),
Inflation and the Income Tax, Washington DC, The Brookings Institution: 1-31.
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, London,
McGraw-Hill.
Brick, I. E. and S. A. Ravid (1985), On the Relevance of Debt Maturity Structure, Journal
of Finance 40: 1423-1437.
Bordignon, M., S. Giannini and P. Panteghini (1999), Corporate Taxation in Italy: An
Analysis of the 1998 Reform, Paper presented at the NHH-CESifo Norwegian-German
Seminar on Public Economics on Capital Income Taxation, Munich, June 3-5, 1999.
Diamond, D. W. (1991), Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk, The Quarterly15
Journal of Economics 106: 709-737.
Emery, G. W. (2001), Cyclical Demand and the Choice of Debt Maturity, Journal of
Business 74: 557-590.
Feldstein, M. S. (1979), Adjusting Depreciation in an Inflationary Economy: Indexing
versus Acceleration, NBER Working Paper 395.
Flannery, M. J. (1986), Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice, Journal
of Finance 41: 19-37.
Gonedes, N. J. (1984), Evidence on the Tax Effect of Inflation under Historical Cost
Accounting Methods, Journal of Business 54: 227-270.
Goswami, G., T. Noe and M. Rebello (1995), Debt Financing under Asymmetric
Information, Journal of Finance 50: 633-659.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1994), A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human
Capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 841-879.
Jalilvand, A. and R. S. Harris (1984), Corporate Behaviour in Adjusting to Capital
Structure and Dividend Targets: An Econometric Study, Journal of Finance 39: 127-
145.
Kane, A., A. J. Marcus and R. L. McDonald (1985), Debt Policy and the Rate of Return
Premium to Leverage, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20: 479-499.
Kay, J. A. (1977), Inflation Accounting: A Review Article, Economic Journal 87: 300-
311.
King, M. A. (1977), Public Policy and the Corporation, London, Chapman and Hall.
King, M. A. and D. Fullerton (1984), The Taxation of Income from Capital: A
Comparative Study of the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and West
Germany, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Kopcke, R. W. (1981), Inflation, Corporate Income Taxation and the Demand for Capital
Asset, Journal of Political Economy 89: 122-131.
Leland H. E. and K. B. Thoft (1996), Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy,
and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, Journal of Finance 51: 987-1019.
Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48: 261-297.
Mitchell, K. (1991), The Call, Sinking Fund and Term-to-maturity Features of Corporate
Bonds: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26:16
201-221.
Morris, J. R. (1976), On Corporate Debt Maturity Strategies, Journal of Finance 31, 29-
37.
Morris, J. R. (1992), Factors Affecting the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt, Working
Paper, College of Business Administration, University of Colorado at Denver.
Myers, S. C. (1977), Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial
Economics, 5: 147-175.
Myres, S. C. and R. G. Rajan (1998), The Paradox of Liquidity, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113: 733-771.
Nam, C. W. and D. M. Radulescu (2003), The Role of Tax Depreciation for Investment
Decision: A Comparison of European Transition Countries, CESifo Working Paper
847.
Ozkan, A. (2000), An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure, European
Financial Management 6: 197-212.
Samuelson, P. A. (1964), Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Ensure Invariant
Valuation, Journal of Political Economy 72: 604-606.
Scholes, M. S. and M. A. Wolfson (1992), Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning
Approach, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.
Sinn, H.-W. (1987), Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation, Amsterdam,
North-Holland.
Sinn, H.-W., W. Leibfritz and A. Weichenrieder (1999), ifo Vorschlag zur Steuerreform,
ifo Schnelldienst 52: 3-18.
Smith, C. W. and J. B. Warner (1979), On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, Journal of Financial Economics 7: 117-161.
Stohs, M. H. and D. C. Mauer (1996), The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity
Structure, Journal of Business 69: 279-312.
Titman, S. (1992), Interest Rate Swaps and Corporate Financing Choice, Journal of
Finance 47: 1503-1516.
Titman, S. and R. Wessels (1988), The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, Journal
of Finance 43: 1-19.
Whited, T. M. (1992), Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment: Evidence
from Panel Data, Journal of Finance 47: 1425-1460. 
CESifo Working Paper Series 




1057 Carsten Hefeker, Structural Reforms and the Enlargement of Monetary Union, October 
2003 
 
1058 Henning Bohn and Charles Stuart, Voting and Nonlinear Taxes in a Stylized 
Representative Democracy, October 2003 
 
1059 Philippe Choné, David le Blanc and Isabelle Robert-Bobée, Female Labor Supply and 
Child Care in France, October 2003 
 
1060 V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli and Carmine Trecroci, Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal  Policy Using a Structural New 
Keynesian Model, October 2003 
 
1061 Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau, Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey, October 
2003 
 
1062 Henning Bohn, Will Social Security and Medicare Remain Viable as the U.S. 
Population is Aging? An Update, October 2003 
 
1063 James M. Malcomson , Health Service Gatekeepers, October 2003 
 
1064 Jakob von Weizsäcker, The Hayek Pension: An efficient minimum pension to 
complement the welfare state, October 2003 
 
1065 Joerg Baten, Creating Firms for a New Century: Determinants of Firm Creation around 
1900, October 2003 
 
1066 Christian Keuschnigg, Public Policy and Venture Capital Backed Innovation, October 
2003 
 
1067 Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, State Intervention on the Market for Natural Damage 
Insurance in Europe, October 2003 
 
1068 Mark V. Pauly, Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive 
Insurance Markets, October 2003 
 
1069 Wolfgang Ochel, Decentralising Wage Bargaining in Germany – A Way to Increase 
Employment?, November 2003 
 
1070 Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation, 
November 2003 
 
1071 Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck, Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical Review of 
the Economics Literature, November 2003  
1072 George Economides, Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos, and Ulrich Woitek, 
Electoral Uncertainty, Fiscal Policies & Growth: Theory and Evidence from Germany, 
the UK and the US, November 2003 
 
1073 Robert S. Chirinko and Julie Ann Elston, Finance, Control, and Profitability: The 
Influence of German Banks, November 2003 
 
1074 Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar, The Taxation of Financial Capital under 
Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox, November 2003 
 
1075 Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen, and Panu Poutvaara, Income Taxes, Property Values, 
and Migration, November 2003 
 
1076 Jonas Agell, Why are Small Firms Different? Managers’ Views, November 2003 
 
1077 Rafael Lalive, Social Interactions in Unemployment, November 2003 
 
1078 Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Surprising French Employment Performance: What Lessons?, 
November 2003 
 
1079 Josef Falkinger, Attention, Economies, November 2003 
 
1080 Andreas Haufler and Michael Pflüger, Market Structure and the Taxation of 
International Trade, November 2003 
 
1081 Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmarker, Endogenous Wage Rigidity, November 2003 
 
1082 Fwu-Ranq Chang, On the Elasticities of Harvesting Rules, November 2003 
 
1083 Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner, The Role of Direct Democracy in the European 
Union, November 2003 
 
1084 Helge Berger, Jakob de Haan and Robert Inklaar, Restructuring the ECB, November 
2003 
 
1085 Lorenzo Forni and Raffaela Giordano, Employment in the Public Sector, November 
2003 
 
1086 Ann-Sofie Kolm and Birthe Larsen, Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground 
Economy, November 2003 
 
1087 Lars P. Feld, Gebhard Kirchgässner, and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Decentralized 
Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local 
Governments, November 2003 
 
1088 Arno Riedl and Frans van Winden, Input Versus Output Taxation in an Experimental 
International Economy, November 2003 
 
1089 Nikolas Müller-Plantenberg, Japan’s Imbalance of Payments, November 2003 
 1090 Jan K. Brueckner, Transport Subsidies, System Choice, and Urban Sprawl, November 
2003 
 
1091 Herwig Immervoll and Cathal O’Donoghue, Employment Transitions in 13 European 
Countries. Levels, Distributions and Determining Factors of Net Replacement Rates, 
November 2003 
 
1092 Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Undescribable Events, November 
2003 
 
1093 Jakob de Haan, Helge Berger and David-Jan Jansen, The End of the Stability and 
Growth Pact?, December 2003 
 
1094 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Taxes and Venture Capital Support, 
December 2003 
 
1095 Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur, From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market. 
More Efficiency but Higher Prices, December 2003 
 
1096 Clemens Fuest and Thomas Hemmelgarn, Corporate Tax Policy, Foreign Firm 
Ownership and Thin Capitalization, December 2003 
 
1097 Laszlo Goerke, Tax Progressivity and Tax Evasion, December 2003 
 
1098 Luis H. B. Braido, Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping, December 2003 
 
1099 Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur, Signaling and Screening of Workers’ Motivation, 
December 2003 
 
1100 Ilko Naaborg,, Bert Scholtens, Jakob de Haan, Hanneke Bol and Ralph de Haas, How 
Important are Foreign Banks in the Financial Development of European Transition 
Countries?, December 2003 
 
1101 Lawrence M. Kahn, Sports League Expansion and Economic Efficiency: Monopoly Can 
Enhance Consumer Welfare, December 2003 
 
1102 Laszlo Goerke and Wolfgang Eggert, Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and 
Unemployment, December 2003 
 
1103 Nzinga Broussard, Ralph Chami and Gregory D. Hess, (Why) Do Self-Employed 
Parents Have More Children?, December 2003 
 
1104 Christian Schultz, Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy, December 
2003 
 
1105 Daniel Haile, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Harrie A. A. Verbon, Self-Serving Dictators and 
Economic Growth, December 2003 
 
1106 Panu Poutvaara and Tuomas Takalo, Candidate Quality, December 2003 
 1107 Peter Friedrich, Joanna Gwiazda and Chang Woon Nam, Development of Local Public 
Finance in Europe, December 2003 
 
1108 Silke Uebelmesser, Harmonisation of Old-Age Security Within the European Union, 
December 2003 
 
1109 Stephen Nickell, Employment and Taxes, December 2003 
 
1110 Stephan Sauer and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Using Taylor Rules to Understand ECB Monetary 
Policy, December 2003 
 
1111 Sascha O. Becker and Mathias Hoffmann, Intra-and International Risk-Sharing in the 
Short Run and the Long Run, December 2003 
 
1112 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja, The E-Correspondence Principle, January 
2004 
 
1113 Volker Nitsch, Have a Break, Have a … National Currency: When Do Monetary 
Unions Fall Apart?, January 2004 
 
1114 Panu Poutvaara, Educating Europe, January 2004 
 
1115 Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, How Do Electoral Rules Shape 
Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?  January 2004 
 
1116 Florian Baumann, Volker Meier, and Martin Werding, Transferable Ageing Provisions 
in Individual Health Insurance Contracts, January 2004 
 
1117 Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, The Economic Value of Cultural 
Diversity: Evidence from US Cities, January 2004 
 
1118 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Monetary and Fiscal Management, Finance, and Growth, January 
2004 
 
1119 Hans Degryse and Steven Ongena, The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation and 
Specialization, January 2004 
 
1120 Piotr Wdowinski, Determinants of Country Beta Risk in Poland, January 2004 
 
1121 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and Redistribution via the Public 
Provision of Private Goods, January 2004 
 
1122 Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on CD Sales: Cross-
Section Evidence, January 2004 
 
1123 Ansgar Belke and Friedrich Schneider, Privatization in Austria: Some Theoretical 
Reasons and First Results About the Privatization Proceeds, January 2004 
 
1124 Chang Woon Nam and Doina Maria Radulescu, Does Debt Maturity Matter for 
Investment Decisions?, February 2004 